Abstract. We show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective by viewing voting profiles as elements of certain well-studied QSn-modules. By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and some basic ideas from representation theory (e.g., Schur's Lemma), this allows us to recast and extend some well-known results in the field of voting theory.
Introduction
For more than 25 years, Donald Saari has been systematically developing a powerful geometric approach to understanding, explaining, and constructing paradoxes that occur in voting [7] - [18] . One of the keys to Saari's geometric approach is the fact that the collection of votes from an election can often be encoded naturally as a vector, which we call a profile, and that election procedures can often be viewed as, or are related to, linear transformations.
By focusing on specific geometric structures in this vector space setting, Saari has been able to sidestep many of the prohibitively difficult combinatorial obstructions that are often associated with voting analysis. In doing so, he draws our attention to the specialized roles played by a handful of specific subspaces of the vector space of profiles. This geometric approach has led to an impressive number of unexpected results in voting theory, as well as a refined understanding of many fundamental and important results in the field (see [14] and [15] for engaging overviews of the subject).
Ever since we began thinking about the mathematics of voting, we have been intrigued by the prominent role played by symmetry arguments in Saari's work (see [9] , [11] , and [14] for gentle introductions to such arguments). In particular, it seemed to us that many of the symmetry-based ideas we were encountering could be explained easily if we only had the right algebraic framework. In this paper, we describe just such a framework. More specifically, we show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective by viewing profiles as elements of certain well-studied QS n -modules.
By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and some basic ideas from representation theory (e.g., Schur's Lemma), we are able to recast and extend some of Saari's well-known results. For example, we recover a result concerning the important relationship between the Borda count and pairwise voting when voters return full rankings of the candidates (Theorem 6). We then extend this result to a situation in which voters return partial rankings of the candidates (Theorem 9). In the process, we construct an infinite family of "Borda-like" voting procedures. With the help of our main theorem (Theorem 1), we also, for example, address the relationship between positional voting and approval voting (Theorem 2).
Our experience to date has convinced us that approaching the study of voting from an algebraic perspective can be incredibly illuminating when it comes to understanding the mathematical underpinnings of many different voting procedures. In fact, we see this paper as a first step toward what might eventually be called Date: December 17, 2007. algebraic voting theory. Although the ideas presented here are just the tip of the iceberg, we believe they will be of great interest to voting theorists and enthusiasts alike.
Voting on Tabloids
We begin by introducing combinatorial objects called tabloids. These objects play an important role in the representation theory of the symmetric group (see, for example, [19] ). Tabloids also appear in the analysis of partially ranked data, which includes the type of voting data we will be considering throughout this paper (see [4] and [6] ).
Let n be a positive integer. A composition of n is a sequence λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) of positive integers whose sum is n. If λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ m , then λ is a partition of n. For example, λ = (2, 1, 1, 3) is a composition of 7, but not a partition of 7, and (4, 2, 1, 1) is a partition (and therefore also a composition) of 8.
The Ferrers diagram of shape λ is the left-justified array of dots with λ i dots in the ith row (see Figure 1) . If the dots of a Ferrers diagram of shape λ are replaced by boxes containing the numbers 1, . . . , n without repetition, then we create a Young tableau of shape λ. Two Young tableaux are said to be row equivalent if they differ only by a permutation of the entries within the rows of each tableau. An equivalence class of tableaux under this relation is called a tabloid of shape λ.
• We will denote a tabloid by first forming a representative tableau and then removing the vertical dividers within each row (see Figure 2 ). For convenience, we will usually choose the representative tableau whose entries in each row are in ascending order. Let X λ denote the set of tabloids of shape λ. Tabloids can be used to index voting data. For example, suppose there are n candidates, c 1 , . . . , c n , in an election. If the voters have been asked to vote by returning a list of the candidates in order of preference, from most to least favored, then each voter is essentially being asked to choose a tabloid from the set X (1,...,1) . For example, if there are n = 3 candidates, then each voter must return one of the following tabloids from X (1,1,1) :
In this case, a voter who returns the second tabloid above prefers c 1 to c 3 to c 2 , whereas a voter who returns the last tabloid prefers c 3 to c 2 to c 1 .
On the other hand, suppose the voters are asked to simply vote for their favorite candidate. We could certainly obtain this information from the choices they made from X (1,...,1) by focusing only on top-ranked candidates. It may be much easier (for us and them), however, to have them choose from the set X (1,n−1) . For example, if n = 4, then we would be asking our voters to choose one of the following tabloids from X (1, In this case, by choosing the third tabloid above, a voter is saying that her favorite candidate is c 3 (and that she is indifferent, as far as her vote is concerned, to candidates c 1 , c 2 , and c 4 ).
When voters are asked to provide their rankings of the candidates by choosing a tabloid from X (1,...,1) , we say that they are giving full rankings of the candidates; if they are choosing tabloids from X λ where λ = (1, . . . , 1), then we say that they are giving partial rankings of the candidates.
To determine the winner of an election based on choosing tabloids from X λ , we need to know the number of votes received by each x ∈ X λ . With that in mind, let p : X λ → N be the function such that p(x) is the number of voters that voted for the tabloid x. The function p is called a profile.
In fact, we will call every function p : X λ → Q a profile. We do this primarily because, unlike functions from X λ to N, the set M λ = {p : X λ → Q} forms a vector space (over Q) where, for all p, q ∈ M λ and all α ∈ Q, (p + q)(x) = p(x) + q(x) and (αp)(x) = αp(x). Note that the dimension of M λ is |X λ |, and that the indicator functions form a basis for M λ (where the indicator function for x ∈ X λ is the function that is 1 on x and 0 on every other tabloid in X λ ).
When it is convenient, we will also view a profile p ∈ M λ as a formal linear combination of the tabloids in X λ , where the coefficient in front of the tabloid x is p(x). For example, if n = 3 and there are eleven voters, then our profile (which is an example used in Chp. 2 of [14] ) might look like where three voters chose the first list, two voters chose the second list, zero voters chose the third list, and so on.
Although viewing profiles as formal linear combinations of tabloids can be useful at times, we will typically view profiles as column vectors in Q |X λ | . We do this by choosing the indicator functions of M λ as a basis, which we order based on the lexicographic ordering of the tabloids. For example, we would encode the above profile as the vector 123  132  213  231  312  321 where we have placed labels corresponding to the rankings to the right of the vector so that the correspondence can be seen more easily.
Positional Voting Procedures
Now that we know what profiles look like, we can turn our attention to voting procedures. In this paper, we will primarily focus our attention on voting procedures that assign points to each candidate based on their position in a voter's choice of a tabloid.
Let λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) be a composition of n, let w = [w 1 , . . . , w m ] t be a vector in Q m , and suppose we are given a profile p ∈ M λ . We use the vector w, which is called a weighting vector, to assign points to each candidate, and the candidate who receives the most points is declared to be the winner. We do this as follows. For each tabloid x, if candidate c i is in row j of x, then she will be given w j p(x) points. Summing over all tabloids x ∈ X λ then determines the total number of points assigned to candidate c i . We will refer to this as a positional voting procedure of type λ based on w.
For example, consider our three-candidate and eleven-voter example above. If we use a positional voting procedure with weighting vector w = [1, s, 0] t , where 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, then candidate c 1 will receive (3 × 1) + (0 × s) + (6 × 0) = 5 points, candidate c 2 will receive (2 × 1) + (7 × s) + (2 × 0) = 2 + 7s points, and candidate c 3 will receive (4 × 1) + (4 × s) + (3 × 0) = 4 + 4s points. We encode these points in the results vector r = [5, 2 + 7s, 4 + 4s]
t .
The point, of course, of using the parameter s in this example is that it highlights one of the things that makes voting theory so interesting: for a fixed profile p, the outcomes of an election can vary wildly with the choice of an election procedure. In fact, as Saari points out in [14] , "...rather than reflecting the views of the voters, it is entirely possible for an election outcome to more accurately reflect the choice of an election procedure."
To see this, note that in the above example, when s = 0, we have the well-known plurality voting procedure ("vote for your favorite"), in which case c 1 wins with a results vector of r = [5, 2, 4] t . When s = 1 ("vote for everyone but your least favorite"), c 2 wins with a results vector of r = [5, 9, 8] t , and when s = 1/2, c 3 wins with a results vector of r = [5, 5 One attractive feature of positional voting is that the results vectors they produce can be realized as the product of a matrix, which we will denote by T w , and the profile in question. For example, if p and w = [1, s, 0] t are as above, then
In fact, and this is a simple but key insight, every positional voting method of type λ based on the weighting vector w can be viewed as a linear transformation T w : M λ → M (1,n−1) since we may use the tabloids in X (1,n−1) to index the set of candidates. For example, we have
is a linear transformation is certainly useful, but there are other, hidden algebraic structures within the framework we have just constructed. To begin to see some of these structures, let λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) be a composition of n. There are n! tableaux of shape λ. In fact, we may think of a tableau as a full ranking of the candidates by reading, left to right, top to bottom, the entries of the tableau. For example, the tableau 
by mapping each full ranking to the tabloid of shape λ that contains it, then note that π • ι : M λ → M λ is the identity transformation.
Let p ∈ M λ , and define p = ι(p). In other words, each profile p ∈ M λ maybe viewed as a profile p ∈ M (1,..., 1) that is constant on the equivalence classes that form the tabloids of shape λ.
is a weighting vector associated to λ, and we define w to be the weighting vector in Q n whose first λ 1 entries are equal to w 1 , whose next λ 2 entries are equal to w 2 , and so on, then
For example, suppose λ = (2, 1), w = [3, 0] t , and 
Representation Theory and the Symmetric Group
We have just seen that profiles can be viewed as vectors, and that each positional voting procedure can be viewed as a linear transformation. In this section, we describe the role that the symmetric group plays in positional voting. In particular, as we illustrate below, each map
is more than just a linear transformation-it is a QS n -module homomorphism.
To explain, let λ be a composition of n. The symmetric group S n acts naturally on the set X λ of tabloids of shape λ by permuting the entries of the tabloids. For example, if n = 5 and σ = (1 3)(2 5 4), then
We may extend the action of S n on X λ to an action of S n on the profile space M λ by defining (σp)(x) = p(σ −1 x). Moreover, we may extend this action to an action of the group ring
The action of QS n on M λ turns M λ into something called a QS n -module. We will not discuss modules in general in this paper (see, for example, [5] for a nice introduction to modules). We will, however, describe some of the more useful implications of this realization as far as voting is concerned.
To begin, note that, for each element a ∈ QS n , there is a linear transformation
denote the ring of linear transformations from M λ to itself (the ring of endomorphisms), then this defines a ring homomorphism ρ :
The homomorphism ρ is an example of a representation of QS n since each element a ∈ QS n may be "represented" by a linear transformation ρ(a) = L a ∈ End(M λ ). Furthermore, if we restrict ρ to the elements of S n , then the images are all invertible linear transformations. In other words, we have a group homomorphism ρ ↓ Sn :
, which is a representation of S n .
The fact that M λ is a QS n -module tells us that we can write M λ as a direct sum of QS n -submodules, which are subspaces that are invariant under the action of QS n (and are therefore QS n -modules themselves). In other words, there are decompositions
A submodule U of a module M is said to be simple if U = 0, and the only submodules of U are 0 and U itself. It turns out that, up to isomorphism, there are only a finite number of distinct simple QS n -modules. Furthermore, these simple modules can be (and typically are) indexed by the partitions of n. In this paper, we use a well-known indexing scheme (see [19] ), and we denote the simple QS n -module indexed by the partition µ of n by S µ .
As an example, it turns out that 1,1) . To make these decompositions more concrete, consider the following decomposition of M (1, 2) :
Both of the subspaces on the right are invariant under the action of QS 3 . The first space, the span of the "all-ones" vector, is obviously invariant under the action of QS 3 . After all, the entries in these vectors are all equal, and permuting the entries of such vectors does not change this fact.
The second subspace, which is the orthogonal complement (with respect to the usual dot product) of the first subspace, is the subspace of vectors whose entries sum to zero. Since this property too is preserved under the action of QS 3 , it too is a submodule of M (1, 2) .
Both of these subspaces are simple QS 3 -modules. The first space is isomorphic to S (3) , and in general, we use S (n) to denote this "trivial", one-dimensional QS n -module that has the property that every element of S n acts as the identity linear transformation. The second space is isomorphic to S (2, 1) , and in general,
is the (n − 1)-dimensional simple module that is isomorphic to the orthogonal complement of the span of the all-ones vector in the n-dimensional QS n -module
To see how all of this is related to voting, let λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) be a composition of n, let w = [w 1 , . . . , w m ] t be a weighting vector, and consider the positional voting procedure T w : M λ → M (1,n−1) of shape λ based on w. First, note that the linear transformation T w is actually a QS n -module homomorphism. In other words, if a ∈ QS n , then T w (ap) = aT w (p). After all, if σ ∈ S n , then we are simply asking that T w (σp) = σT w (p), which is the same as saying that, "if we permute the labels on the candidates, then we need only permute the original scores in the same way." We are just extending this notion, which is called neutrality (see, for example, [18] ), to the action of the entire group ring.
Viewing T w as a QS n -module homomorphism is helpful for a couple of reasons. First, if T : M → N is a module homomorphism, then the kernel of T is a submodule of M , and the image of T is a submodule of N . In fact, if we define the effective space E(T ) of T to be the orthogonal complement (with respect to the usual dot product) of the kernel of T , then E(T ) ∼ = T (M ) as modules. Therefore, knowing something about E(T w ) might help us say something about T w .
Second, once we know we are dealing with module homomorphisms, we can look to an elementary but immensely useful theorem for insight:
Schur's Lemma. Any nonzero module homomorphism between simple modules is an isomorphism.
How can we make use of Schur's Lemma in our study of voting? Consider our positional voting procedure
. As we noted above, the module M (1,n−1) is isomorphic to a direct sum of the simple modules S (n) and S (n−1,1) . This means that any simple submodule U of M λ that is not isomorphic to S (n) or S (n−1,1) must be in the kernel of T w , i.e., such a submodule only contains information that will have absolutely no effect on the results of the election.
For example, if n = 3 and we have T w : 1,1) , we know that the kernel of T w must contain exactly one copy of S (1,1,1) and at least one copy of S (2, 1) . We will say more about this below. Before we do, however, we need one more idea. Although it may appear simple on the surface, it will play a major role in what follows.
First, note that there is a bijection between the full rankings in X (1,...,1) and the permutations in S n , where the tabloid
i n is mapped to the permutation σ with the property that σ(j) = i j . It follows that we may view each profile p ∈ M (1,...,1) as an element of QS n , where we simply replace each full ranking with its associated permutation. This means that if p ∈ M λ , then we may view p ∈ M (1,...,1) as an element of QS n that is constant on the left cosets of the subgroup of S n that fixes the tabloid containing the tableau corresponding to the identity of S n . (We will use this fact in the proof of Theorem 1.)
How is viewing a profile as an element of QS n helpful? It means that our positional voting procedures are more than just linear transformations, and more than just QS n -module homomorphisms-they are the results of profiles acting on weighting vectors! More specifically, if p ∈ QS n is a profile, and w ∈ Q n ∼ = M (1,n−1) is a weighting vector, then T w (p) = pw.
For example, in the three-candidate and eleven-voter example introduced above, note that if e ∈ S 3 is the identity and we use the usual cycle notation for the other elements in S 3 , then
This realization-that if p ∈ M (1,...,1) , then T w (p) = pw, i.e., "the acted upon has become the actor"-leads us to our first theorem. Before we state the theorem, though, we need a few observations about weighting vectors whose entries sum to zero.
It is important to keep in mind the relatively simple structure of the space M (1,n−1) in which our weighting vector w resides (together, of course, with all of our results vectors). In particular, since
, we may write w = 1 w + w, where 1 w ∈ S (n) is the projection of w onto the all-ones vector 1, and w ∈ S (n−1,1) is the projection of w into the orthogonal (n − 1)-dimensional subspace of vectors whose entries sum to zero. For example, if n = 3 and w = [1, s, 0] t , then 1 w = [ Since T w (p) = pw = p(1 w + w) = p1 w + p w and p1 w ∈ S (n) , all of the information that will determine the outcome of the election is contained in the summand p w. After all, p1 w is simply some multiple of the all-ones vector and will therefore not differentiate between any of the candidates. Because of this, we will focus most of our attention on weighting vectors w ∈ M
(1,n−1) = Q n such that w = w, i.e., weighting vectors whose entries sum to zero.
For convenience, we say that a vector in Q n whose entries sum to zero is a sum-zero vector. We also say that such a vector is nontrivial if it does not equal the zero vector (since the weighting vector w = 0 would obviously lead to the trivial result that the candidates all tie with zero points). A consequence of using a sum-zero weighting vector w is that the results vector r = T w (p) will also be a sum-zero vector. Keep in mind, however, that the winner is still the candidate that receives the most number of points. 
Proof. We first consider the full ranking case where λ = (1, . . . , 1). In this case, w i = w i . The sum-zero vectors in Q n ∼ = M (1,n−1) form a simple QS n -submodule (that is isomorphic to S (n−1,1) ), which we will denote by U . Since the weighting vectors are linearly independent, there exists a linear transformation
By a theorem of Burnside (see, for example, [3] ), every linear transformation from a simple QS n -module to itself can be realized as the action of some element in QS n . In other words, there is some a ∈ QS n such that T (u) = au for all u ∈ U . Moreover, there exist infinitely many b ∈ QS n such that bu = 0 for all u ∈ U . If we set p = a + b, then the theorem follows since T wi (p) = pw i = aw i + bw i = r i + 0.
For a general λ, note that if {w 1 , . . . , w k } ⊂ Q m is linearly independent, then so is {w 1 , . . . , w k } ⊂ Q n . We proved above that there exist infinitely many p ∈ QS n such that pw i = r i . But, as we saw earlier, we may replace p with p ′ , where p ′ is constant on the equivalence classes that form the tabloids of shape λ. We may therefore also view p ′ as an element of M λ , in which case
Theorem 1 is an extension of Saari's Theorem 1 in [8] in two ways. First, Saari's theorem is a statement about ordinal rankings, i.e., the order in which the candidates finish in the election. Our theorem says something about cardinal rankings, i.e., the actual number of points that each candidate receives. Second, whereas Saari's theorem focuses on the fully ranked situation, we address both the fully and partially ranked situations simultaneously.
Both theorems essentially imply that as long as the weighting vectors w 1 , . . . , w k are different enough, it could very well be the case that there is no relationship whatsoever between T w1 (p), . . . , T w k (p). Moreover, as Saari describes in [14] and [15] , this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to answering the question, "How bad can it get?" Note, however, that our proof is decidedly algebraic in nature. Whereas Saari's proof of Theorem 1 in [8] uses facts about open mappings, our proof of Theorem 1 uses an important result by Burnside concerning the endomorphism ring of simple modules.
Approval Voting
Theorem 1 may be used to address paradoxical situations that arise in voting procedures related to positional voting. For example, the approval voting procedure asks a voter to return an (unordered) list of the candidates of whom she approves. A candidate receives a point for each time she appears on such a list, and the candidate receiving the most points is declared the winner. (For more on approval voting, see [2] .)
We naturally assume that, if a voter were to return a fully ranked list of the candidates, then the candidates she would approve of would make up the top portion of her list. We may therefore imagine a situation in which each voter is asked to return a fully ranked list of the candidates together with a cutoff point.
Candidates above the cutoff are those whom our voter approves of, and those below the cutoff are not.
We will denote the cutoff point in a tableau with a blank space separating the "approved" candidates from the other candidates. For example, if n = 3, then the top row of Figure 3 contains those tableaux with cutoffs that would be used by voters who only approve of their top candidate, whereas the second row contains those tableaux with cutoffs that would be used by those voters who approve of their top two candidates. Although it is perfectly fine for a voter to approve of all or none of the candidates in approval voting, such a preference will have absolutely no impact on the outcome of the election. For convenience, we will therefore assume that our voters approve of at least one, but not all, of the candidates. In this setting, our ranked approval profile looks like
where p i corresponds to those voters who have approved of exactly i candidates.
Approval voting is related to positional voting in that we may view it as being made up of several positional voting systems occurring simultaneously. To explain, consider the weighting vector
and note that the sum-zero portion of the results of the election using approval voting is given by
On the other hand, for a positional vote with respect to the weighting vector w, the sum-zero portion of the result is given by (p 1 + p 2 + · · · + p n−1 ) w = r pos .
In the spirit of extending the ideas found in Theorem 1 to other settings such as approval voting, the following theorem shows that r app and r pos need not have anything in common.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3, let r app and r pos be any two sum-zero results vectors in Q n , and let w be any nontrivial sum-zero weighting vector in Q n . Then there exist infinitely many ranked approval profiles
such that the approval voting outcome of p is r app , and the positional voting outcome with respect to w is r pos .
Proof. It must be the case that w and a 1 are linearly independent, or w and a 2 are linearly independent. Suppose, without loss of generality, that w and a 2 are linearly independent. Set p 1 and p 2 such that p 1 a 1 = r app , p 2 a 2 = 0, and p 2 w = r pos − p 1 w, which we know can be done by Theorem 1. Then set
The resulting ranked approval profile p has the desired property. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, there are an infinite number of such ranked approval profiles.
Equivalent Weighting Vectors and Effective Spaces
At this point, it is helpful to put an equivalence relation on weighting vectors. The idea is that two weighting vectors should be equivalent if and only if they yield the same ordinal rankings for all profiles. For convenience, we focus our attention on the fully ranked situation throughout this section.
Let the all-ones vector in Q n be denoted by 1. We say that two weighting vectors w and x in Q n are equivalent, and write w ∼ x, if and only if there exist α, β ∈ Q such that α > 0 and x = αw + β1. This equivalence relation is often used in the literature to simplify calculations and to pinpoint non-cosmetic differences between different positional voting procedures.
To motivate this equivalence relation, note that, for any positive rational number α ∈ Q, it makes sense to say that w is equivalent to αw since, for every p ∈ M (1,...,1) , the ordinal ranking given by T w (p) is the exactly the same as that of T αw (p). After all, the entries in T αw (p) are simply the entries of T w (p) multiplied by α > 0.
Furthermore, suppose α, β ∈ Q where α > 0. If x = αw + β1, then the ordinal ranking given by T x (p) is exactly the same as that given by T w (p). This is because the addition of β1 to αw changes each candidate's score by exactly the same amount.
Note that w ∼ x if and only if there is a positive rational number γ ∈ Q such that w = γ x, i.e., the sum-zero component of w is a positive multiple of the sum-zero component of x. This is helpful to see because, by Theorem 1, it means that two weighting vectors w and x will always yield the same outcome if and only if w ∼ x. We therefore have the following theorem: It is helpful to view Theorem 3 in terms of effective spaces, which is an approach used extensively and with great success by Saari (see, for example, [12] , [13] , [14] , and [16] ). Recall that the effective space E(T ) of a linear transformation T is the orthogonal complement ker(T ) ⊥ of the kernel of T . For convenience, if w is a weighting vector, then we will denote the effective space of T w by E(w) (rather than E(T w )).
As a QS n -submodule of the profile space QS n , the effective space E(w) of any nontrivial sum-zero weighting vector w is isomorphic to S (n−1,1) . If w ∈ Q n has a nontrivial projection onto the all-ones vector and w = 0, then E(w) ∼ = S (n) ⊕ S (n−1,1) . On the other hand, if w is simply a nonzero multiple of the all-ones vector (so w = 0), then E(w) ∼ = S (n) (and we only get ties).
Theorem 4. Let w and x be nontrivial sum-zero weighting vectors in Q n . Then E(w) = E(x) if and only if w ∼ x or w ∼ −x. Furthermore, if E(w) = E(x), then E(w) ∩ E(x) = {0}.
Proof. Suppose E(w) = E(x). This implies that ker(T w ) = ker(T x ) = ker(T −
On the other hand, if w ∼ x or w ∼ −x, then w and x are linearly dependent (since we are assuming that w = w and x = x). Thus, ker(T w ) = ker(T x ), implying that E(w) = E(x).
Finally, E(w) ∩ E(x) is a submodule of both E(w) and E(x), and E(w) and E(x) are simple submodules (that are isomorphic to S (n−1,1) ). Thus, if E(w) = E(x), then it follows that E(w) ∩ E(x) = {0}.
By Theorem 4, distinct effective spaces for sum-zero weighting vectors intersect only at 0. We can, however, say more. To explain, we write w ⊥ x if the dot product of w and x is zero, i.e., if they are orthogonal. Furthermore, if U and W are subspaces of a vector space such that every vector in U is orthogonal to every vector in W , then we write U ⊥ W .
Recall that we may view permutations σ ∈ S n as tableaux in M (1,...,1) . For example, the permutation σ = (124)(35) corresponds to the tableau 2 4 5 1 3 in M (1,1,1,1,1) . In particular, note that the position that candidate j occupies with respect to the permutation σ is given by σ −1 (j), in which case, for a weighting vector w = [w 1 , . . . , w n ] t , candidate j would receive w σ −1 (j) points. Proof. First, note that E(w) is simply the row space of T w when we view T w as a matrix with respect to the indicator functions of M (1,...,1) . It follows that if E(w) ⊥ E(x), then each row of T w is orthogonal to each row of T x . The dot product of the first row of T w and the first row of T x , however, is a non-zero multiple of the dot product of w and x, as we show below in (1) . It follows that, if E(w) ⊥ E(x), then w ⊥ x.
On the other hand, suppose w ⊥ x. Partition the permutations of the candidates into n sets X 1 , . . . , X n where X i contains the permutations that have the first candidate, c 1 , in the ith position. Within each X i , every candidate other than c 1 occupies every position other than the ith position the same number of times, namely (n − 2)! times. This is because the ith position is taken by c 1 , and by fixing c j , j = 1, in some position, we are free to place the other candidates in (n − 2)! ways.
The rows of T w correspond to functions defined on the permutations of the n candidates. The value that the jth row assigns to the permutation σ is w σ −1 (j) , which is, of course, the weight given to candidate j based on the permutation σ.
Let r 1 (w) be the first row of T w , and let r j (x) be the jth row of T x . These rows may be viewed as elements of QS n , where (r 1 (w))(σ) = w σ −1 (1) and (r j (x))(σ) = x σ −1 (j) . Taking dot products yields
It follows that
On the other hand, if j = 1, then
which implies that
Thus, if w ⊥ x, then we have that r 1 (w) ⊥ r j (x) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. To complete the proof, note that the ith row of T w is the result of acting on r 1 (w) with the transposition ξ = (1 i) that swaps 1 and i. It follows that
Thus, the row space of T w is orthogonal to the row space of T x . In other words, E(w) ⊥ E(x).
The Borda Count
If you are familiar at all with Saari's work, then you know that the Borda count, i.e., the positional voting procedure for n candidates that uses the weighting vector w = [n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0] t , plays a special role when it comes to positional voting. In this section, we use the algebraic framework we have thus far created to show why this is the case. In doing so, we also begin to pave the way toward an analogue to the Borda count for partially ranked voting data.
To motivate our discussion, consider the so-called Copeland Method for running an election. This procedure is based on information concerning head-to-head contests between the candidates. For each candidate c i , let w(i) and l(i) be the number of head-to-head contests won and lost, respectively, by c i . The winner under Copeland's Method is the candidate whose difference w(i) − l(i) is largest.
In our running example of an election with three candidates and eleven voters, candidate c 3 defeats both c 1 and c 2 in head to head contests, and c 2 defeats c 1 . The scores for candidates c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 are therefore 0 − 2 = −2, 1 − 1 = 0, and 2 − 0 = 2, respectively. Thus, c 3 is the winner using the Copeland Method. Note, by the way, that c 3 beat all of the other candidates in head-to-head contests. When such a candidate exists, she is said to be a Condorcet winner.
What makes the Copeland Method interesting for us is that all of the results can be derived from the image of a map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) which we call the pairs map. The idea behind the pairs map is that it extracts all of the necessary information concerning pairs of candidates (think head-to-head contests). The defining characteristic of P is that it maps a basis vector u in M (1,...,1) to the sum of all basis vectors in M (1,1,n−2) whose associated ordered pairs are ranked in the same order as they are ranked in u. Given the profile p ∈ M (1,...,1) , the scores for Copeland's Method can all be determined from the image of p under the pairs map. You need only consult the coefficients of P (p) to determine the winner of each head-to-head contest. Moreover, there are several examples of voting procedures that essentially rely solely on pairs data (see, for example, a list of such procedures in Chapter 4 of [1] ).
An interesting question now arises. What relationship, if any, is there between a map T w and the pairs map P ? To make this question more concrete, let T : V → W and T ′ : V → U be two linear transformations defined on the same vector space V . We say that T ′ is recoverable from T if there exists a linear transformation
It is easy to show that T ′ is recoverable from T if and only if ker(T ) ⊆ ker(T ′ ) which, in turn, occurs if and only if E(T ′ ) ⊆ E(T ).
This leads us to a much more specific form of the question above. For what weighting vectors w ∈ Q n is T w recoverable from P ? To answer this question, we will focus on the effective spaces of our positional voting procedures and pairs map. Once again, the representation theory of the symmetric group will play an important role.
The first thing we want to do is to note that the pairs map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) is a QS n -module homomorphism. Thus, we may make use of Schur's Lemma. Next, we turn our attention to the effective space of P . The codomain M
(1,1,n−2) of the pairs map P has the following decomposition into simple submodules:
Furthermore, it can be shown (using, for example, a dimension argument) that the image, and therefore the effective space, of P is isomorphic to S (n) ⊕ S (n−1,1) ⊕ S (n−2,1,1) . Since there is only one copy of S (n−1,1)
in this decomposition, it follows by Theorem 4 that there are at most two nontrivial equivalence classes of weighting vectors whose effective spaces are contained in the effective space of P . As the following theorem (which is essentially implied by Theorem 3.2.1 in [10] ) shows, there are such equivalence classes. They are the equivalence classes that contain the Borda count and its negative.
Theorem 6. Let n ≥ 2, and let w ∈ Q n be a nontrivial weighting vector (i.e., w ≁ 1). The map T w is recoverable from the pairs map P if and only if w or −w is equivalent to the Borda count.
Proof. By the above discussion, it is enough to show that if w is the Borda count weighting vector, i.e., w = [n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0] t ∈ Q n , then T w is recoverable from the P . This, however, is trivial. In fact, the results vector one obtains by using the Borda count can be (and often is) viewed as the sum of the points awarded to a candidate from all of her head-to-head victories, and these points are encoded (blatantly) in the image of the pairs map P .
One of the nice properties that the Borda count enjoys is that, if there is a Condorcet winner, she is never ranked last by the Borda count (see, for example, Corollary 5 in [12] ). By Theorem 1, any weighting vector that is not equivalent to w = [n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0] t does not enjoy this property. In fact, in the class of positional voting procedures for fully ranked profiles, the Borda count maximizes the probability that a Condorcet winner is actually ranked first [20] . For more on the relationship between the Borda count and Copeland's method, see [7] and [17] .
The Borda count also has what is called reversal symmetry. In other words, under the Borda count, if all of the voters were to completely reverse their ballots so that their first choice is now their last, their second choice is now second to last, and so on, then the resulting ordinal ranking would be the complete reversal of the original result. When n = 3, the Borda count is the unique weighting vector (up to equivalence) with this property, but when n ≥ 4, there are others. For example, w = [6, 5, 1, 0] t has this property. This is easy to see, however, once you recognize that [6, 5, 1, 0] t ∼ [3, 2, −2, −3] t .
Analogues to the Borda Count
Recall that if voters are returning fully ranked ballots, then the Borda count and its negative are the unique (up to equivalence) nontrivial positional voting procedures that are recoverable from the pairs map. What if, however, the voters do not return fully ranked ballots? What if it has been decided that it is infeasible to ask voters to rank all of the candidates?
In this section, we turn our attention to the "rank-only-your-top-k" situation in which λ = (1, . . . , 1, n− k) = (1 k , n − k). By generalizing only slightly the pairs map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) , we are able to generalize Theorem 6 to the "rank-only-your-top-k" situation. Interestingly, and in contrast to the fully ranked case, we show that there is more than one "Borda-like" equivalence class of weighting vectors.
We generalize the pairs map as follows. Let 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, and define P
(1,1,n−2) as we did for the pairs map P in the full ranking case, except now, if two candidates c i and c j are tied for last place, then we assign both of the ordered pairs (c i , c j ) and (c j , c i ) the value τ (think "points for tying"). By letting τ be a parameter, we are able to consider simultaneously an infinite number of analogues of the pairs map P .
For example, suppose n = 4 and λ = (1, 1, 2) . Then the image of the basis vector corresponding to t to be the partial weighting vector corresponding to λ = (1 k , n − k) where b i = n − i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
This is the partial weighting vector one would get by "averaging the Borda count with respect to λ." In other words, we essentially use the Borda count for the top k candidates, but we assign the average of the last n − k Borda count points to each of the last n − k candidates. This average is In other words, the result corresponding to the ith candidate is determined by summing all of the entries corresponding to the ordered pairs (i, j) where j = i, i.e., all of the pairs in which candidate c i is beating some other candidate.
The map ψ b τ is easily seen to be a QS n -module homomorphism. If we let u e be the indicator function corresponding to the tabloid that contains the identiy permutation e ∈ S n , then we may easily check that Similarly, we may construct a linear transformation ϕ b such that T b = ϕ b • P k τ . First, note that for any indicator function u, if we sum the entries of P k τ (u), we always get the same value E where E = (n − 1) + (n − 2) + · · · + (n − k) + 2t n − k 2 .
With that in mind, we define the QS n -module homomorphism by setting
Again, we may check (perhaps with a bit more work this time) that
Our next goal is to show that b and b τ are equivalent if and only if τ = 1/2. This is straightforward. If they were equivalent, then the ratios of the differences between successive entries would have to be the same. In particular, it would be the case that
This, however, is true if and only if τ = 1/2, since the above equation reduces to 1 (n − k) − Finally, we turn our attention to characterizing those weighting vectors that are recoverable from P k τ . We begin with a proposition. appears exactly twice in any decomposition of M (1,1,n−2) into simple modules, we know that any decomposition of I into simple modules can contain at most two copies of S (n−1,1) . Furthermore, since b is a nontrivial weighting vector and T b = ϕ b • P k τ , we know that I must contain at least one copy of S (n−1,1) .
Let J be the direct sum of the two simple modules that are isomorphic to S (n−1,1) in a decomposition of M (1,1,n−2) into simple modules. In other words, J is the so-called isotypic subspace of M (1,1,n−2) corresponding to S (n−1,1) . It turns out that any simple submodule of M (1,1,n−2) that is isomorphic to S (n−1,1) is necessarily a submodule of J. We will make use of this fact shortly.
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